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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-02-10 09:32:30 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-02-10 09:32:30 -0800
commitb63c90720348578631cda74285958c3ad3169ce9 (patch)
treee79503d20dda1e113f6b369e46b4235a9b289694 /security
parent958f7fb68c6be4e2d9dcb5bf31bfe746f6744aa3 (diff)
parent965e9a2cf23b066d8bdeb690dff9cd7089c5f667 (diff)
Merge tag 'keys-next-20260206' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keys update from David Howells: "This adds support for ML-DSA signatures in X.509 certificates and PKCS#7/CMS messages, thereby allowing this algorithm to be used for signing modules, kexec'able binaries, wifi regulatory data, etc.. This requires OpenSSL-3.5 at a minimum and preferably OpenSSL-4 (so that it can avoid the use of CMS signedAttrs - but that version is not cut yet). certs/Kconfig does a check to hide the signing options if OpenSSL does not list the algorithm as being available" * tag 'keys-next-20260206' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: pkcs7: Change a pr_warn() to pr_warn_once() pkcs7: Allow authenticatedAttributes for ML-DSA modsign: Enable ML-DSA module signing pkcs7, x509: Add ML-DSA support pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to do whatever digestion it wants itself pkcs7, x509: Rename ->digest to ->m x509: Separately calculate sha256 for blacklist crypto: Add ML-DSA crypto_sig support
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 457c0a396caf..87be85f477d1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
goto out;
}
- pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
- pks.digest_size = datalen;
+ pks.m = (u8 *)data;
+ pks.m_size = datalen;
pks.s = hdr->sig;
pks.s_size = siglen;
ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);